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THE NEW ENGLISH APPROACH TO EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS: SHOULD AMERICAN COURTS
DECLARE THEIR INDEPENDENCE?
INTRODUCTION
For over a century, England and the United States have relied on
the use of formalistic legal rules to determine liability in emotional
distress cases. In the 1983 decision of McLoughlin v. O'Brian,' the
House of Lords rejected the further use of mechanical rules and
adopted a new English approach.2 According to the new approach,
the infliction of emotional distress is analyzed on an ad hoc basis with
liability determined under a pure foreseeability test. 3
The American approach to emotional distress continues to be
grounded in formalism, with the majority of jurisdictions adhering to
the zone-of-danger doctrine.4 The symbiotic nature of the Anglo-
1. [1982] 2 All E.R. 298.
2. Id. at 302.
3. Id. at 299.
4. The majority adherence to the zone-of-danger doctrine is supported by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts which provides in relevant part:
313: Emotional Distress Unintended
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject
to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third
person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it were
caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm of
another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a
third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreason-
able risk of bodily harm to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
436: Physical Harm Resulting From Emotional Disturbance
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to
protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the
harm results solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional
disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other
similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results
solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not
protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other
results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate
family occurring in his presence.
Caveat:
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American legal systems and the continued expansion of liability in
negligence suggests that American courts might adopt the new Eng-
lish approach. In fact, the foundation for such an adoption has
already been laid in a minority of jurisdictions.5
This Note will examine the consequences of this prospective
development and determine whether American courts would be well-
advised to adopt the English foreseeability test. Part One defines emo-
tional distress and examines why this injury has traditionally posed
problems of proof and causation. Part Two discusses the symbiotic
nature of the American and English legal systems in the area of emo-
tional distress. Historically, both countries have borrowed heavily
from one another in developing their respective legal rules governing
the limits on liability. Part Three discusses relevant legal process con-
siderations and argues that explicit rules of law are inextricably
entwined with fundamental policy concerns of the English and Ameri-
can legal systems. The Section also suggests that the American legal
system is significantly less suited for the new English approach and
examines those systemic differences that reinforce this hypothesis.
The Note concludes that the American legal system requires a formal-
istic approach to emotional distress and should therefore maintain an
independent body of law to cover this specialized area.
I. DEFINING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The scope of legal recovery for emotional distress is considerably
narrower than is generally believed.6 Courts in both England and the
United States agree that the law should not readily compensate
momentary sensations of fright, anger, or feelings of grief, anguish, or
sorrow.7 These primary responses are typically transient sensations
The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in Subsection (2)
may apply where bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm
or peril to a third person who is not a member of his immediate family, or where
the harm or peril does not occur in his presence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
5. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
6. Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock, 99 LAW Q. REv. 100, 105
(1983).
The law has traditionally refused to compensate pure mental disturbance without accom-
panying physical symptoms. Where negligence resulted directly in physical injury, policy
considerations did not prevent the courts from awarding compensation for accompanying
elements of pure mental damage, including fright at the time of the accident, anxiety as to
its effects, nervousness, or embarrassment as to disfigurement. Once a cause of action was
established by the physical injury, courts felt confident that the mental harm was genuine in
nature. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 327, 330 (4th ed. 1971). Early common law excep-
tions to the physical injury requirement included cases involving intentional torts, the neg-
ligent transmission of telegrams, and the negligent handling of corpses. Id. at 52, 58.
7. Some courts have rejected a formal distinction between primary and secondary
responses as they pertain to recovery for emotional distress, substituting a test which
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and may be "experienced by 'any normal person.., when someone he
loves is killed or injured.' "8 Anxiety and depression, normal human
emotions, are considered part of the risk of living.9
In contrast to primary responses are the more serious secondary
responses which are generally eligible for recovery.10 These responses
are "longer-lasting reactions caused by an individual's continued
inability to cope adequately with a traumatic event."11 Secondary
responses generally result in either a recognized medical condition,
such as a heart attack, or a recognized psychological illness, such as a
serious neurosis. 12 The most typical neuroses include various anxiety
reactions such as nervousness, nausea, weight loss, stomach pains and
backache. 13 Thus, "the first hurdle which a plaintiff claiming damages
[for infliction of emotional distress] must surmount is to establish that
he is suffering from, not merely grief, distress, or any other normal
emotion, but a positive psychiatric illness."' 14 Although courts gener-
ally agree on this medically-based definition, more complex problems
arise when the plaintiff attempts to "establish the necessary chain of
causation in fact between his psychiatric illness and the death or injury
focuses on the "seriousness" of the injury. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520
P.2d 758, 767 (1974).
8. McLoughlin, [1982] 2 All E.R. at 311.
9. Id. It is less clear what role an unusual susceptibility to mental disturbance should
play in imposing defendant liability. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock and Mental Distur-
bance § 27 (1968). The general rule does not impose liability where the defendant's mis-
conduct would not have caused emotional distress to a normal person. E.g., Knierim v.
Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 86 (1961), 174 N.E.2d 157. Hence, damages were denied by an Ameri-
can court where the emotional distress appeared to be the product of an overly "sensitive
mind or morbid imagination." Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688,
696 (D.C. Ark. 1959) (citing 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 184 (1938)).
The overall problem remains that "normality in psychic tolerance is a standard both
scientifically untenable and impractical to apply." J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 149
(6th ed. 1983). Although a prior English decision recognized an objective standard of
"normalcy" applicable to both the plaintiff and defendant, Bourhill v. Young, [1942] 2 All
E.1L 396, [1943] A.C. 92, 109-110 (Lord Wright), normality is no longer accepted as the
proper test. In cases involving an individual's physical handicaps, such as blindness or
allergies, a subjective standard has been adopted in both England and the United States.
See, eg., Mount Isa Mines v. Pusey, [1970] 125 C.L.R. 383.
The following factors are considered when dealing with a plaintiff predisposed to injury:
(1) whether the defendant acted negligently or intentionally, (2) whether the defendant had
knowledge of the plaintiffs sensitivity, (3) whether the susceptibility is extraordinary, or is
one common to a large number of persons, and (4) whether the defendant's actions would
have distressed a normal person. This last factor narrows the question to one of liability for
the aggravation of harm caused by the individual's hypersensitivity. 38 AM. JUR. 2D
Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 27 (1968).
10. Leong, 520 P.2d at 767.
11. Id.
12. Teff, supra note 6, at 105.
13. Id.
14. McLoughlin, 2 All E.R. at 311 (Lord Bridge).
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of one or more third parties negligently caused by the defendant." I5
Courts, historically inundated with fictitious personal injury suits,
have been reluctant to risk exposure to a more dubious area of
claims.1 6 It is far more difficult to ascertain the extent and the source
of emotional injury than to identify the cause and severity of a physi-
cal injury, such as a broken arm. 17
The symptoms of emotional distress can be easily feigned, and the
judiciary remains skeptical about medical science's ability to diagnose
effectively mental trauma and its causes.18 Many courts fear that
"unscrupulous lawyers with the aid of equally unscrupulous doctors
[would] obtain from sympathetic juries verdicts upon purely
fabricated evidence." 19 Hence, claims of emotional distress are partic-
ularly likely to produce complex litigation.20 Such litigation chal-
lenges the factfinder's ability to distinguish accurately meritorious
claims.21 The American approach, through the use of formalistic
rules, minimizes the factfinder's opportunity to err in the performance
of this task.22
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Early common law permitted recovery for mental suffering only
as "parasitic damages" accompanying an award for separate physical
injury.23 The judicial expansion of liability beyond parasitic damages,
however, opened a legalistic Pandora's box-creating the need for
legal mechanisms designed to control liability.24 Thus, courts in both
15. Id. The McLoughlin decision distinguishes between the use of experts on the issue
of causation versus the issue of foreseeability. While the court endorsed the use of such
testimony on the former, it considered expert testimony on the latter as "too large an inno-
vation in the law." Id. at 312 (Lord Bridge). It is procedurally unclear how this distinction
would be implemented within the American system. See infra text accompanying notes 99-
107.
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 328, 330. Examples of judicial anxiety over increased
litigation and fraudulent claims may be found in a large number of earlier opinions. See,
e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Miller v. Balti-
more & O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Huston v. Freemansburgh Bor.
ough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 328.
18. . FLEMING, supra note 9, at 146.
19. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 59 HARV. L. REv. 725, 733 (1937), and cases cited
therein.
20. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
IND. L.J. 467, 515-19 (1975-76).
21. Margolis, 7he Case Against Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 7 LITIGA-
TION 19, 22 (Fall 1980).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 98-106.
23. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480 (1984).
Parenthetically, it is noted that wrongful death statutes in several American jurisdictions
allow for an award of damages for emotional distress suffered by a close relative.
24. Henderson, supra note 20, at 515-16, and cases cited therein.
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England and the United States have endorsed the use of formal legal
rules in cases of emotional distress. 25 The formalism of these rules
limiting liability promotes the important policy goals of predictability
and consistency. 26
The common legal heritage shared by England and the United
States has established a symbiotic relationship between the two coun-
tries. Each system has monitored the development of its counterpart's
doctrine within this vexing area of tort law. As can be seen from the
following examination of relevant case law, courts in both countries
have readily embraced the other's precedent in order to support their
own opinions.
A. THE IMPACT RULE
The 1888 English landmark decision of Victorian Railway Com-
missioners v. Coultas27 predicated recovery for emotional distress on
an implicit requirement of physical contact. 2s By limiting liability for
emotional distress to those instances where a plaintiff was physically
touched by the defendant, or an instrumentality within his control, the
court kept recovery within manageable dimensions. The impact rule
also represented a judicial attempt to solve the problem of causation.29
By identifying physical contact as the causal link between a defend-
ant's conduct and a plaintiff's subsequent emotional distress, the rule
theoretically guaranteed the genuineness of the plaintiff's mental
injury. 30 Courts in the United States, equally concerned with limiting
liability, were quick to adopt the impact rule.31
25. Lambert, Tort Liabilities for Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, 37 J.A. TRIAL
LAW. AM. 1 (1978).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
27. [1888] 13 A.C. 222 (P.C.). In Coultas, the defendant and her husband approached
a railroad crossing in a horse-drawn carriage. A gatekeeper opened the gate allowing them
to cross the tracks. When the Coultases were half-way across the tracks, a train
approached. Ignoring the order of the gatekeeper to turn back, the Coultases continued
toward the far gate, insisting that it be opened. The negligent gatekeeper refused to com-
ply, and the Coultases remained stranded between the closed gate and the passing train.
Although the train passed without hitting the carriage, Mary Coultas was terrified by the
danger and sued for emotional distress. Both she and her husband were initially successful
in obtaining damages for mental distress; however, their victory proved to be short-lived.
On appeal, the Privy Council rejected the viability of any claim for emotional distress
absent the additional requirement of physical impact on the plaintiff. Id.
28. Id. The Coultas court phrased its decision in terms of the "remoteness" of the
damage, holding that the plaintiff's harm was too remote to compensate. Id. at 226. Nev-
ertheless, the absence of physical contact was the underlying ratio decidendi of the case.
E.g., J. FLEMING, supra note 9, at 147.
29. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (recovery denied
for miscarriage allegedly caused by fright because not proximate result of defendant's
negligence).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 331.
31. The impact rule appeared in the 1896 New York case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co., supra note 29, and soon was adopted in many other jurisdictions. The plaintiff in
1986]
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The inflexibility of this early rule often yielded idiosyncratic
results, leaving many injured plaintiffs without legal recourse.3 2 This
rigidity contributed to the rule's demise in England only thirteen years
after its inception.33 American courts, confronted with the rule's
inflexibility and an increasing body of medical knowledge challenging
the rule's validity, initially attempted to salvage the rule through the
use of semantics. Thus, the judicial definition of "impact" was
expanded to include a trivial blow, 34 a superficial buM, 35 an electric
shock, 36 a minor jostling,37 dust in the eye,38 or the inhalation of
smoke.39 When the utility of these attempts to broaden the definition
of "impact" became increasingly suspect, the majority of American
courts followed the English lead and rejected the impact rule.4°
Mitchell, while waiting in a cross-walk, was confronted by a runaway horse-drawn van.
The negligently controlled horses failed to stop until the plaintiff stood between the horses'
heads. Shocked by the incident, the plaintiff collapsed and thereafter suffered a miscar-
riage. The court, noting the lack of any physical impact, labelled the emotional injury to
the plaintiff as too remote and denied recovery. One year later, the courts of Massachusetts
embraced the impact rule in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88
(1897). In Spade, the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied recovery for emotional distress
to a plaintiff who, although severely disturbed by a streetcar incident, failed to prove physi-
cal impact.
32. This draconian doctrine transformed a plaintiff's good fortune in escaping injury
into a legal misfortune. E.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (recov-
ery denied to a plaintiff seeking damages for a heart attack because no physical contact
occurred between the plaintiff and defendant's trespassing bull).
33. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1902] 2 K.B. 669.
34. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); ef Homans
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (recovery allowed for ner-
vous shock where it accompanied slight injury, whether shock due to visible injury or
merely accompanied it).
35. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d
272 (1929).
36. Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948).
37. Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
38. Porter v. Del., L & W R.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906).
39. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930). In 1928 the absurdity of
the definitional expansion of "impact" was underscored by a circus case in which impact
was defined to include a defendant's horse defecating into the lap of the plaintiff. Christy
Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
40. The impact rule retained a surprising vitality in a minority of American jurisdic-
tions. New York adhered to the rule until 1961, when it was rejected in Battalla v. N.Y.,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). The plaintiff-infant in Battalla
was negligently placed in an unsecured chair-lift at a ski resort. As a result, the child
became frightened and hysterical and subsequently suffered emotional distress. The court,
critical of the policy arguments previously used to support the rule, noted that "mere expe-
diency cannot commend itself to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal
right and remedy in all cases because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real
one." Id. at 731 (citing Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692
(1909)).
Seventeen years later, the Massachusetts court reached a similar conclusion in Dziokon-
ski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). The Dziokonski opinion not only
repudiated the impact rule, but within Massachusetts, hurled the discredited doctrine into
the "ash heap of [legal] history." Lambert, supra note 25, at 7.
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B. THE ZONE-OF-DANGER DoCTRiNE
The zone-of-danger doctrine filled the void created by the rejec-
tion of the impact rule. The doctrine, first articulated in the English
case of Dulieu v. White & Sons, 41 permits recovery for emotional dis-
tress suffered when a plaintiff is within the radius of risk of physical
contact but no impact occurs. Any emotionally distressed plaintiff
outside the zone of danger is denied recovery as a matter of law.42
The elimination of the physical impact requirement increased the
likelihood of litigation, including emotional distress claims brought by
third parties. The zone-of-danger doctrine has proved particularly
proficient at limiting the number of these claims by providing a facile
determination of those eligible to recover.4 3
When the doctrine was first formulated, medical evidence sug-
gested that, absent impact, lasting nervous shock occurred only in sit-
uations where an individual feared for his or her own personal
safety." Although subsequent medical knowledge has largely discred-
ited this initial premise, the doctrine has failed to evolve accordingly.
Moreover, when applied to a particular genre of cases, the doctrine's
logical underpinnings rapidly deteriorate.45 For example, the doctrine
fails to recognize the enhanced likelihood that a parent outside the
zone of danger, fearing for the safety of his or her child, will suffer
emotional distress.46 Similarly, an individual could experience emo-
As recently as 1980, however, Indiana adhered to the impact rule. Indiana Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Hudson, 399 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1980) (recovery denied for mental suffering
caused by injury to real estate).
41. [1901] 2 K.B. 669. The plaintiff in Dulieu was tending bar in her husband's public
house. A negligently operated horse-drawn van was driven into the building and the terri-
fied plaintiff subsequently suffered a miscarriage. Sustaining her claim for mental distress
and consequential physical injury, the Dulieu court held that fear, capable of producing
actual physical injury even without physical impact, was sufficient to support a cause of
action. Id. at 674, 682 (Kennedy, J.).
42. Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J.). Compare eg., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn.
400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969) (the defendant's negligent construction work caused a wall to
collapse next to a shop in which the plaintiff was purchasing clothing; although untouched
by the wall, the plaintiff suffered severe shock from the sound of the crashing structure
which resulted in physical illness; the court, rejecting the requirement of impact, focused
instead on the plaintiff's proximity to the source of danger) with, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 98 Ill.2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983) (the plaintiff witnessed his brother being
strangled when his clothing became entangled in a negligently operated escalator; as a
result, the plaintiff allegedly suffered severe psychiatric trauma; the plaintiff, outside of the
sacrosanct zone of danger, was denied recovery).
43. In an important caveat, the Dulieu court explicitly excluded bystander recovery for
those outside the zone of danger. [1901] 2 K.B. at 675 (Kennedy, J.); see also J. FLEMING,
supra note 9, at 147.
44. Dulieu, [1901] 2 K.B. at 675 (Kennedy, J.); see also Harvard, Reasonable Foresight
of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. REV. 478 (1956).
45. Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1300.
46. Recognizing the special relationship of parent and child, and in the interest of
equity, judges on occasion have departed from a literal formulation of the doctrine. See
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tional distress resulting from fear for the safety of a friend, co-worker,
or even a total stranger.47 Notwithstanding these medical and concep-
tual shortcomings, the zone-of-danger doctrine remains the American
majority rule in cases concerning emotional distress.48
C. BYSTANDER RECOVERY: BEYOND THE ZONE OF DANGER
The typical situation in a bystander recovery case involves a
plaintiff, outside the zone of danger, who witnesses an accident to
another individual, usually a close family member.49 As a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff-witness suffers emotional distress,
often resulting in physical illness. Because the plaintiffs in these cases
are in no danger of physical injury, a traditional application of the
zone-of-danger doctrine would preclude recovery.
The legal barrier to bystander recovery imposed by the zone-of-
danger doctrine was surmounted in the 1924 English decision of Ham-
brook v. Stokes Brothers.50 The Hambrook court held that a fear of
immediate injury, either to oneself, or one's children, created a valid
claim for emotional distress. Although language in the opinion sug-
gested a willingness to expand recovery to include all accident wit-
nesses and bystanders, the court limited its holding to similar fact
patterns involving mothers and their children. Moreover, the decision
introduced an additional limiting factor: the plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress must result from that which he either saw or perceived through
his "own unaided senses." 51
The permissive attitude toward bystander recovery underlying
the decision in Hambrook resurfaced in the 1968 American decision of
Dillon v. Legg.52 Challenging the necessity of formalistic rules, the
Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.). See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
47. See Mount Isa Mines v. Pusey, [1970] 125 C.L.R. 383; Dooley v. Cammell Laird &
Co., [1951] Lloyd's Rep. 271; see also J. FLEMING, supra note 9, at 151; Lambert, supra
note 25, at 11.
48. Lambert, supra note 25, at 7, and cases cited therein.
49. Id. at 11.
50. [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A. 1924). In Hambrook, the defendant negligently left the
engine running in his parked truck. The unattended vehicle rolled down a street on which
the plaintiff's three children were walking. The plaintiff's wife, aware of the presence of
her children on the street, spotted the runaway truck and suffered nervous shock. Her fear
for the safety of her children caused a hemorrhage, resulting in her death.
51. Id. at 152. See Hinz v. Berry, [1970] 2 Q.B. 40 (C.A.) (during a picnic, while the
plaintiff-mother was picking flowers across the road, a negligent driver hit her family's van;
she turned to view the accident at the sound of the crash; recovery was granted).
52. 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In Dillon, a mother was
about to cross the street with her two daughters. A negligently driven automobile struck
one daughter as she stepped off the curb. Both the mother and remaining daughter sued
for emotional distress caused by witnessing the fatal accident. The lower court allowed the
daughter's claim but rejected the plaintiff-mother's claim, considering the mother to be
outside the zone of danger. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, rejecting
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California Supreme Court in Dillon recommended a flexible approach
based on foreseeability. The court suggested three relevant guidelines
for measuring foreseeability-proximity, contemporaneous obser-
vance, and relationship to the victim-each to be considered on a case-
by-case basis.53 A minority of American courts have chosen to follow
the foreseeability approach in Dillon, thus rejecting the traditional for-
malistic American approach.54
the zone-of-danger doctrine, and thus, significantly expanding the boundaries of recovery
for emotional distress.
53. 441 P.2d at 920-21. In an effort to impose some limits on recovery, the court
restricted claims for emotional distress to those accompanied by physical symptoms. 441
P.2d at 920.
54. Prior to Dillon, the conceptual expanse between the formalistic zone-of-danger doc-
trine and the new English approach based on foreseeability may have seemed too great for
American law to traverse in a single step. Dillon, however, may well represent a conceptual
stepping stone, creating the illusion that what previously appeared to be an impossible leap
is now a manageable move forward.
A number of post-Dillon decisions have further expanded recovery beyond the require-
ment of accompanying physical symptoms suggested in Dillon. In Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 369, 520 P.2d 758 (1974), a ten-year-old boy was crossing the street with his step-
grandmother when he spotted an approaching car. The woman, failing to notice the car,
was struck and killed. Shocked by the accident, the plaintiff, manifesting no physical symp-
toms, subsequently returned to school and resumed his normal activities. In awarding
damages for emotional distress, the decision analogized the requirement of physical symp-
toms to the prerequisite of physical impact. The court rejected both requirements, viewing
them as artificial barriers to recovery. Thus, according to Leong, physical symptoms are
merely "admissible as evidence of the degree of... emotional distress suffered." Id. at 762.
An interesting twist on expanded liability appeared in the case of Paugh v. Hanks, 6
Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1982). On no less than three separate occasions, negli-
gently driven automobiles crashed into the living room of the Paughs' home. Although the
plaintiff and her family escaped physical injury, the court upheld a cause of action:
[ ]hile some may view our decision... as an unsettling quantum leap into this
diflicult area of the law, the situation is one of paramount necessity in fitting the
law to the dynamics ... of... twentieth century society. We view our decision
today as a bold and promising step in ensuring an individual's right to emotional
tranquility.
Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added).
One year later, the Paugh court decided Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St.3d
131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). In this case, the plaintiff was driving his car behind a truck
which was negligently carrying sheets of glass. One of the sheets dislodged, bounced off the
highway, and shattered against the plaintiff's windshield. Although a medical examination
revealed no physicai manifestations of shock, the plaintiff's claim for emotional distress was
successful. The Ohio court, acknowledging the trend of recent California decisions, held
that a plaintiff may state a cause of action for emotional distress without accompanying
physical symptoms, provided that the distress was foreseeable and "serious." Id. at 111-12
n.4.
In contrast, some post-Dillon cases have transformed the purportedly flexible guidelines
into rigid rules for denying recovery. Indicative of this genre is Kelley v. Kokua Sales &
Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). The plaintiff in Kelley sued for emo-
tional distress after receiving a long distance telephone call. The caller informed him of the
accidental deaths of his daughter and granddaughter in Hawaii. In denying the claim, the
court refused to allow recovery for shock-induced injuries suffered by plaintiffs not "located
within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident." Id. Hence, the concept of
"proximity" to an accident, originally recommended as a measure of foreseeability, Dillon,
441 P.2d at 920, was used instead to measure miles and to set arbitrary boundaries of
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D. THE AFTER-MATH DOCTRINE
The English after-math doctrine expands both the temporal and
spatial definition of "accident" beyond its literal moment of occur-
rence. 55 Prior to the formulation of this expansive theory, legal
authority in England and the United States predicated recovery upon
a contemporaneous witnessing of the accident's actual occurrence.5 6
The doctrine permits recovery for absentee plaintiffs by redefining the
requirement of contemporaneous observance to include the witnessing
of the post-accident after-math.5 7 As discussed below, the new Eng-
lish approach to emotional distress was adopted in the context of an
after-math case.58
E. THE NEW ENGLISH APPROACH: REASONABLE
FORESEEABILITY
Under the current American approach, application of the zone-
of-danger doctrine remains a two-step process. First, the court uses
liability. See Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. OF HAWAII L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979).
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982), represents a
hybrid among the Dillon progeny. While recognizing pure psychic injury without accom-
panying physical symptoms, the Maine court used a constricted interpretation of Dillon as
a prophylactic device to limit liability. In stressing that the plaintiffs claim satisfied the
requirements of proximity, contemporaneous observance and a close relationship of the
victim, the court treated the Dillon "guidelines" as an all-or-nothing proposition. Id. at
438.
The Dillon court itself later limited its holding in the case of Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.
3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). The case involved a father who suffered
shock as a result of watching the negligent delivery of his stillborn child. In dismissing the
claim, the California Supreme Court defined a "contemporaneous observance" as "contem-
poraneous perception." 19 Cal.3d at 584. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTNGS L.J. 583, 594 (1982)
("Justus appears to require understanding by the plaintiff of the nature of the injuries being
suffered by the victim while they are initially being suffered." (Emphasis in original)).
See also Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Cal. 1977) (en bane)
(although plaintiff-husband did not see his wife's accident, his presence at the scene and his
perception of his wife's death warranted the award of damages); Hathaway v. Superior Ct.,
112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1980) (mother discovered her child
moments after it had been electrocuted but was denied recovery because she had not wit-
nessed the actual moment of electrocution).
55. The doctrine was first formally recognized by the House of Lords in McLoughlin,
[1982] 2 All E.R. 298; see Lambert, supra note 25, at 22.
56. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
57. See McLoughlin, [1982] 2 All E.R. at 304 (Lord Wilberforce). The term "after-
math" can be judicially expanded or contracted to include virtually any period of time or
series of post-accident events. Compare Benson v. Lee, [1972] Vict. R. 879 (Vict.) (recov-
ery for damages due to nervous shock permitted on foreseeability grounds for a mother
who neither heard nor saw her son's accident but ran to the scene immediately afterwards),
with Chester v. Council of the Municipality of Waverly, 62 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1939) (recov-
ery for damages due to nervous shock denied for a mother who neither heard nor saw her
son's accident but was present when his body was recovered; recovery denied because of a
lack of duty owed to the mother).
58. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
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objective criteria to determine which claims are allowable as a matter
of law. If a claim clears this legal hurdle, foreseeability then becomes
a question of fact for the jury. In contrast, the new English approach
enunciated in McLoughlin v. O'Brian59 collapses this traditional bifur-
cated inquiry into a question solely of fact. Within the English system,
however, this purported transformation is largely semantic, since the
English judge is also the factfinder.6°
In McLoughlin, the negligent defendant severely injured the
plaintiff's husband and three children in a road accident. One child
subsequently died, and the other victims suffered critical injuries.
When the tragedy occurred, the plaintiff was at home two miles away.
Arriving at the hospital, she heard of her child's death, witnessed her
remaining family's extensive injuries, and consequently suffered from
"severe and persistent" emotional distress. 61
The Court of Appeal sustained the lower court's dismissal,62
denying recovery for the plaintiff despite recognition that the plaintiff's
shock was foreseeable. 63 Stephenson, L.J., concluded that although
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, policy considera-
tions precluded an award of damages. 4 Influenced by precedent, Ste-
phenson argued that "commercial sense and practical convenience"
should limit relief to those on or near the highway at the time of the
accident.65 Griffiths, L.J., reasoned that although the injury was fore-
seeable, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care.66 Also
influenced by the authority of prior case law, Griffiths stated that the
duty of care owed by motor vehicle drivers was "limited to persons
and owners of property on the road or near to it who might be directly
affected .... ",67
The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal and adopted a
reasonable foreseeability test to determine liability in emotional dis-
59. [1982] 2 All E.R. 298.
60. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
61. [1982] 2 All E.R. 298. The plaintiff's plight in McLoughlin is similar to that of a
rescuer, who is normally considered foreseeable by traditional tort law. J. FLEMING, supra
note 9, at 151; see also J. HENDERSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 543-45 (1981). In fact, Chad-
wick v. British Ry. Bd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912, specifically involved emotional distress
encountered in a rescue situation. The plaintiff in Chadwick volunteered his assistance in
the aftermath of a train disaster and later recovered for the emotional distress triggered by
the traumatic experience.
62. [1981] 1 All E.R. 809 (C.A.).
63. [1982] 2 All E.R. 298, 302 (per Lord Wilberforce).
64. [1981] 1 All E.R. 809, 820 (Stephenson, L.J.).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 824 (Griffiths, L.J.).
67. Id. at 827. Griffiths also expressed concern over the increased anxiety likely to be
experienced by a plaintiff suffering shock when faced with the prospect of prolonged litiga-
tion. Id.
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tress cases. 68 The majority denied the existence of any policy reasons
sufficient to justify a narrower limit on liability.69 Writing the lead
opinion, Lord Bridge of Harwich stated that liability for emotional
distress must be decided on the facts of each case under the reasonable
foreseeability test.70 Significantly, Lord Bridge's conclusion was based
on his confidence in the ability of English judges to discern legitimate
claims of emotional distress "with an eye enlightened by [a] progres-
sive awareness of mental illness."'71 His Lordship viewed a "consensus
of informed judicial opinion" as the best measure for determining
whether emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable in any given
case.
72
Thus, under the majority view in McLoughlin, foreseeability is
ultimately a question of fact with the factfinder unconstrained by arbi-
trary rules of law predetermining the boundaries of liability. 73 Factors
such as space, time, distance, the nature of injuries sustained, and the
plaintiff's relationship to the victim, although relevant to the inquiry,
would no longer act as legal limitations on recovery. 74 Liability would
end "[w]here in the particular case the good sense of the judge...
decides" it should.75
The McLoughlin decision relied on a number of explicit assump-
tions in expanding the boundaries of permissible liability. First, in the
court's view, the need for continual development of the law out-
weighed the need for predictability. 76 Second, the McLoughlin court
stated that, under its new approach, both the number of successful
claims and the amount of damages will be "moderate. ' 77 While each
of these assumptions is arguably valid with respect to the English legal
system, their validity is subject to serious challenge when viewed in the
context of its American counterpart.78
68. [1982] 2 All E.R. at 320.
69. [1982] 2 All E.R. at 304, 307, 310-11, 320 (Lords Wilberforce, Edmund-Davies,
Russell, Scarman, and Bridge). Lord Scarman believed any curtailment on the basis of
policy must come from the legislature. Id. at 310-11. Lords Wilberforce and Edmund-
Davies believed sufficient public policy reasons did exist. Id. at 303, 308-09.
70. Id. at 320.
71. Id. at 312-13.
72. Id. at 312.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 311 (Lord Scarman). See id. at 318-20 (Lord Bridge) (referring to Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
75. McLoughlin, [1982] 2 All E.R. at 320.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 319.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98.
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The McLoughlin decision rejects the use of explicit rules of law in
cases of emotional distress. To appreciate fully the implications of this
new approach, it is necessary to briefly examine the nature of legal
rules and their traditional role within the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem.79 This Section begins with some observations concerning the
need for explicit rules and the relationship of rules to the concepts of
consistency and predictability.80 Next, this Section examines the rela-
tive capability of the English and American systems to function prop-
erly in the absence of explicit rules of law. Finally, this Section
considers the consequences and the costs likely to be incurred by each
system upon the elimination of rules of law.
A. THE FUNCTION OF RULES
The zone-of-danger doctrine, although seemingly an obsolete,
arbitrary rule, provides a degree of specificity essential to the proper
functioning of the American legal system. As one commentator has
noted, "[law without rules... would not be a system of law as we
know it."81
An important distinction must be drawn between a rule and a
standard. A rule, such as the zone-of-danger doctrine, may be defined
as a tool for implementing one or more predetermined policy objec-
tives.8 2 In contrast, a standard, such as reasonable foreseeability,
although lacking the specificity of a rule, allows for greater discretion
in its application. 3 In a given fact situation, the use of an inherently
flexible standard may produce more "just" results on an individual
basis. A rule, however, serves the broader legal process concerns of
predictability and consistency, which must be balanced against con-
cerns for substantive fairness.8 4
79. It is important to distinguish between two issues raised by any inquiry into the
desirability of a rule. The first, discussed in this Section, concerns the broad question of
whether a legal system genuinely requires concrete rules of law as opposed to flexible stan-
dards. Assuming this initial inquiry is answered affirmatively, the second issue, largely
beyond the scope of this Note, concerns the extent to which a particular rule is the appro-
priate one.
80. For purposes of this Note, an efficient legal system is one in which social and eco-
nomic costs are minimized and social and economic benefits are maximized. A complete
discussion of this concept appears in Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
81. R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
1-1 (1985) (unpublished, available from authors).
82. Id.
83. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 80, at 258.
84. See id. at 275. A "perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of rules brings society
nearer to its desired allocation of resources." Id. at 262.
A simple analogy, proposed by Professor James Henderson, Cornell Law School, illus-
trates the benefit of rules from a process perspective and emphasizes the inherent limita-
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Predictability is a fundamental goal of any legal system.8 5 In gen-
eral terms, predictability results in an efficient society where costs are
minimized and benefits maximized. Moreover, in the specific context
of emotional distress, explicit rules define the parameters of permissi-
ble behavior: they increase the probability of penalizing those engaged
in socially undesirable activities and protecting those engaged in desir-
able behaviors. 86 The consistent and thus predictable treatment of sim-
ilar claims minimizes the danger of offending the community's sense of
fairness and in turn reinforces society's respect for the law.8 7 The abil-
ity to predict the outcome of litigation also increases the rate of out-of-
court settlement, thereby reducing the cost of litigation and further
increasing efficiency.18
Conversely, flexible standards of liability foster ambiguity, which
may, in turn, "chill" productive social conduct. 89 Hence, in an atmos-
phere of expanded liability for emotional distress, "a rational individ-
ual, especially if he is risk averse, may incur heavy costs to avoid even
a slight risk of [liability] .... "90
Thus, explicit rules, as opposed to general standards, tend to
maximize the social goals of predictability and consistency. The dis-
cussion below analyzes the relative capacity of English and American
courts to adjudicate effectively without explicit rules.
tions of a standard-based approach. Presently, only those American citizens eighteen years
of age or older are eligible to vote. The voting rule denies an important privilege to many
under the age of eighteen who are otherwise qualified to handle this responsibility. In this
regard, the rule is clearly underinclusive: it automatically precludes all those who fail to
satisfy its objective parameters and leaves no opportunity for exceptions based on a subjec-
tive appraisal of individual voter capability. Likewise, the overinclusiveness of the voting
rule permits many citizens to vote who might be denied the right if evaluated under a
subjective standard. If process concerns are ignored, a compelling argument can be made
that the voting age requirement should be replaced by a procedure that individually
appraises the capability of each person desiring to vote. Viewed from this extreme, it
becomes apparent that the abolition of formal rules controlling voting is untenable.
Although a subjective process of evaluating voters would likely result in a fairer and more
just composite, the selection process itself would exhaust such time and resources that the
election would be postponed indefinitely.
The above analogy is not intended to argue that the zone-of-danger doctrine is the ideal
rule for handling cases of emotional distress; nor does the analogy suggest that eighteen is
the ideal majority age for voting. The analogy does, however, underscore the importance of
formal rules in the efficient functioning of the legal system. Specifically, in the context of
emotional distress, American adherence to the zone-of-danger doctrine provides a desirable
degree of consistency and predictability that the foreseeability standard does not provide.
85. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 80, passim.
86. Id. at 264.
87. G. CALABRIESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 294 (1970).
88. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 80, at 265.
89. Id. at 263.
90. Id.
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B. RELATIVE CAPABILITY TO FuNCTION wiTHoUT EXPLICIT
RULES
Two characteristics arguably allow the English legal system to
function without an explicit rule of law governing cases of emotional
distress. First, English judges share a common background that
increases the likelihood of consistent results. Second, England has vir-
tually eliminated jury trials in all personal injury cases.91
English judges are members of a relatively homogeneous group.
Typically, they share a common educational background and similar
social and moral values.92 Equally important in the context of this
discussion, they possess as a group an accurate awareness of the policy
concerns which shape the current body of English law and have an
enduring respect for precedent resulting in a substantial reluctance to
depart from prior law.93
Due to these common attributes, the McLoughlin decision's elim-
ination of explicit rules poses a minimal threat to consistency. In all
likelihood, English judges, despite McLoughlin's grant of greater dis-
cretion, will apply implicitly shared notions of appropriate legal pol-
icy. Consequently, within the English system, lower courts may
continue to produce consistent results. Although an occasional case
may be decided anomalously, the system as a whole should continue to
function consistently and predictably.94
American judges, particularly at the state level, form a far more
heterogeneous group than their English counterparts.95 In the United
States, the judicial selection process promotes diversity among judges,
resulting in a panorama of socioeconomic, political, and legal back-
grounds. In addition, the judiciary in any particular region of the
91. Margolis, supra note 21, at 19. In England, jury trials are granted only in rare civil
cases involving "personal reputation such as libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and fraud." Id. The discretionary power of the judge to order a jury trial
was effectively eliminated in Ward v. James, 1 Q.B. 273 (1966).
92. R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, supra note 81, at 2-22. With regard to the legal exper-
tise of the English judiciary, "the judge is invariably a former barrister of high standing at
the bar and thus brings all of that experience to the fact finding process." Id. at 5-10.
93. English judges are often reluctant to regard themselves as entitled to create
exceptions to a "firm" rule laid down in a somewhat dogmatic manner by a higher
court. Unless the rule is laid down in a way that acknowledges that exceptions or
departures are permissible in special circumstances, lower court judges may be
inclined to think that the statement of a rule means that it must be applied without
exceptions, or that the function of exceptions should be left to higher courts. And
higher courts themselves may be disinclined to modify firm rules by the introduc-
tion of exceptions creating "uncertainty."
Id. at 2-31.
94. "[Even in the absence of any rules at all... in England, customary norms or
homogeneity of values among decisionmakers may in fact operate to make decisions more
structured, more uniform and more formal .... " Id. at 2-22.
95. Id. at 5-10.
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country may be influenced by local custom and values. This lack of
homogeneity does not argue against the competence of any individual
judge. Rather, it suggests the improbability of achieving a uniform
legal consensus absent explicit rules of law.96 Hence, regardless of the
procedural role ultimately reserved for the American judiciary under
the new English approach,97 the removal of explicit rules of law would
diminish predictability within the American system.98
A second reason why the English legal system may continue to
function predictably in the area of emotional distress-despite the
absence of a formal rule of law-is that England has virtually elimi-
nated jury trials in personal injury cases. Since American courts have
continued to use juries in such cases, an American importation of the
English approach would necessitate a shift in the traditional allocation
of functions between judge and jury. Because foreseeability is usually
a question of fact rather than one of law, a jury would theoretically be
responsible for determining liability.99 From a practical standpoint,
however, it seems unlikely that the American system would tolerate
the wholesale removal of the judge from the adjudicative process.
Regardless of how the responsibility for determining liability
would be allocated, the proper functioning of the American jury, like
the American judiciary, is dependent upon the presence of explicit
rules of law. 00 As previously discussed, the ability of a system to pro-
duce consistent results without explicit rules is primarily a function of
96. But see generally Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards
in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57
N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 521 (1982). Professor Twerski argues that even in the absence of explicit
rules, American judges are capable of screening cases through the expanded use of the
directed verdict.
97. See infra text accompanying note 99.
98. The problem of predictability is further complicated within the United States by its
multi-state jurisdictional system. Under the American approach, the jurisdictional prob-
lem remains manageable. Although the majority of states now adhere to the zone-of-dan-
ger doctrine, others have chosen to maintain or develop their own formalistic approaches.
Nonetheless, the United States remains uniform in its current approach to emotional dis-
tress insofar as every state bases recovery on some type of formalistic approach. The over-
all American legal system may be described as yielding results which are "predictably
divergent." Thus a plaintiff, although required to meet varying prerequisites for recovery
in various states, can predict where he stands legally in any given state.
Should a majority of states adopt the English approach, a significant drop in the existing
level of predictability could be anticipated. State courts would lack a formal doctrine artic-
ulating their own legal policy, and findings of liability would vary with individual fact
patterns and individual judges and juries. At such a point, the aggregate system would
only be capable of producing what may be termed "unpredictably divergent" results.
99. Currently under the American approach, the judge initially establishes which
claims are appropriate for jury consideration. He may refuse to permit the claim as a
matter of law or, alternatively, he may defer to the jury for a decision of fact. Thus, the
judge is in a position to use the jury on those matters "towards which the law is relatively
neutral and where the layman's sense of values is deemed to be as good" as his own.
Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 65 (1956).
100. Henderson, supra note 20, at 515-19.
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its ability to substitute shared notions of implicit policy concerns. 10 1
The characteristics of the jury which enable it to perform its tradi-
tional role as factfrnder argue against its ability to implement these
policy concerns.
Jury members are selected in part because of their ignorance of
the law as opposed to their legal expertise.102 Due to this lack of tech-
nical knowledge, juries base their verdicts largely on their sense of sub-
jective fairness and the sympathy felt for a particular plaintiff or
defendant. 103
Concededly, the idea of approaching emotional distress cases on
the basis of fairness possesses superficial appeal. Such an approach,
however, would substantially diminish predictability and consistency,
thus transforming the American legal system into a "thinly disguised
lottery."'' 4 Plaintiffs confronted with nothing more than a subjective
standard of fairness would be forced to wager on the emotional whims
of a jury in evaluating the chance of successful litigation.
Casting additional doubt on the wisdom of a subjective fairness
approach is the distinction between the interests of an individual in a
particular case and the interests of society as a whole. The jury, being
fact-sensitive and responsive to instant equities, may favor the interests
of the individual. In the extreme, the jury may even "find 'facts' that
are not really facts because [it] wants ... the plaintiff to recover dam-
ages because [it] feels justice really demands as much in the case
involved."' 1 5 Explicit rules, which when viewed subjectively seem to
result in the denial of individual justice, nonetheless serve the objective
needs of a system dependent upon predictability and consistency.
Jurors who view a given case subjectively rarely analyze the objective
concerns of predictability and consistency prior to rendering a
verdict. 106
Even with explicit rules, the subjective nature of the jury process
interjects a degree of unpredictability into the legal system. For exam-
101. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
102. R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, supra note 81, at 5-26.
103. One recent study analyzed approximately 19,000 jury verdicts over a 20-year
period (1960-1980). In addition to concluding that juries are more sympathetic, the report
suggested that this characteristic significantly increases the amount of damages awarded.
Clifford, Study of Jury Verdicts Yields Interesting Overview, Legal Times, Nov. 22, 1982, at
15, col. 1.
104. Henderson, supra note 20, at 468.
105. R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, supra note 81, at 5-3.
106. Assuming, arguendo, that a jury is inclined to premise its decision-making on
notions of objective community fairness, rather than on a subjective standard, its task
remains formidable. Such an ability assumes that juries are able to discern what the com-
munity standards of fairness are. "mTlhe increased complexity and interdependence of
modem society [,however,] renders an ... analysis based upon a concept of community
[fairness] . . . exceedingly difficult." Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. Rlv. 537, 549 n.46 (1972).
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pie, a jury may either fail to understand the law as charged or choose
to "nullify" the law.10 7 Nonetheless, by pre-determining a class of
plaintiffs whose cases are eligible to reach the jury, explicit rules signif-
icantly enhance the predictability of the system.
The elimination of explicit rules in England or the United States
would result in a greater number of decisions which fail to adequately
serve traditional process concerns. The nature of the English judiciary
may minimize the number of these decisions in England relative to
those generated in the United States. Hence, all other things being
equal, England may be better suited to operate under the open-ended
approach endorsed in McLoughlin.
C. SYSTEMIC DIFFERENCES
The relative inability of the United States to effectively implement
the McLoughlin decision is further diminished by various systemic dif-
ferences between the two countries. These systemic differences affect
both the number of decisions which fail to adequately serve process
concerns and their attendant costs.
Because legally-defined boundaries no longer limit the number of
potential plaintiffs, the McLoughlin decision potentially increases the
number of claims seeking redress for emotional distress. Mere consid-
erations of administrative convenience, of course, do not justify the use
of a formalistic legal doctrine.108 Nonetheless, assuming that the elim-
ination of explicit rules would increase the percentage of American
decisions inimical to process concerns, the total number of detrimental
decisions will increase proportionately with the number of claims
brought.
The problem of increased litigation may be aggravated within the
United States by contingent fee arrangements which provide an incen-
tive for a segment of the legal profession to pursue potential claimants
who otherwise would not be seeking legal redress. 0 9 Attorney-initi-
ated litigation is particularly problematic in emotional distress cases
due to the amorphous nature of mental injury.110 This problem is
likely to become more pronounced if the United States adopts the
107. See R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, supra note 81, at 5-25.
108. Thus, the floodgates argument against a flexible standard of recovery for emotional
distress has largely been discredited. See, e.g., McLoughlin, [1982] 2 All E.R. 298, 304;
Paugh, 6 Ohio St.3d at 75. Contra Rickey, 98 Ill.2d at 555 (1980).
109. J. HENDERSON, supra note 61, at 543.
110. The inherent difficulty in defining emotional distress has been exacerbated by a
number of recent decisions. In an effort to demonstrate an acceptance of expanded liabil-
ity, several courts have included under the term emotional distress vague notions of
"mental and emotional well-being" and "pure psychic injury." See Chesley, The Increas-
ingly Disparate Standards for Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injury, 52 U. oF
CiNN. L. REv. 1017, 1034-35 (1983).
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English approach, because aggressive attorneys will no longer be lim-
ited to a legally prescribed class of plaintiffs eligible to recover.
Considerably less potential for increased litigation exists in Eng-
land. In addition to disallowing contingent fees, the English system
requires the losing litigant to pay all court costs including his oppo-
nent's legal fees."' This system of cost allocation provides an impor-
tant disincentive to frivolous litigation, which is conspicuously absent
from the American system.
The disparate treatment of damages by the two countries raises
additional doubt regarding the suitability of the English approach for
the United States. Militating against large damage awards in England
is a comprehensive social welfare system which ensures that those in
need are provided with assistance.11 2 More significantly, because the
English judiciary assesses damages, their "calculation... has become
a much more precise and mathematical exercise"' 1 3 than in the United
States. Hence, the determination in England of "discount rates for
future earnings, pre-judgment interest rates, and even the fixing of
damages for non-pecuniary loss"1114 are more consistent and
predictable.
In contrast, American damage awards under the English
approach might be inflated. Injured plaintiffs in the United States may
be more likely to rely on the judicial system to provide the largest
portion of their compensation.' 1 5 Furthermore, even if a plaintiff
receives substantial social welfare payments for injuries sustained, the
collateral-source rule prohibits American juries from considering these
payments. "16
Higher damages in emotional distress cases are not inherently
wrong. Damages for emotional distress awarded without regard for
process concerns, however, decrease the predictability of the legal sys-
tem and thereby generate indirect social costs otherwise minimized by
the use of explicit rules." 7 In addition to the greater number of deci-
sions anticipated within the United States under McLoughlin that
111. J. FLEMING, supra note 9, at 579.
112. Double recovery is permitted by statute in certain instances. In such cases, the
general disparity between English and American social welfare programs becomes less sig-
nificant. J. FLEMING, supra note 9, at 219-21.
113. R. SUMMERS & P. ATIYAH, supra note 81, at 5-31.
114. Id. at 5-31 to -32.
115. J. FLEMING, supra note 9, at 219-21.
116. The rule finds conceptual support at common law to the extent that the tort system
has never hesitated to redress in full economic loss regardless of disparities in income levels.
A defendant has never been able to argue that his damages should be reduced because the
plaintiff's income was unseemingly high. Tort law, engaged in corrective justice, tradition-
ally has left matters of distributive justice for other branches of the law. Blum, Ceilings,
Costs and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, UTAH L. REV. 341, 359 (1973).
117. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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would ignore process concerns, the potential for greater damage
awards in the United States suggests that the direct dollar cost of these
decisions would be significantly greater as well.
CONCLUSION
Since the first claim for emotional distress, common law limits on
liability have continued to expand. For over a century, both England
and the United States have moved toward more liberal recovery, peri-
odically redefining their legal doctrine to reflect changing attitudes
toward emotional injury.
Currently, the majority of American courts continue to rely on a
formalistic rule limiting liability. The historical interdependence of
the English and American legal systems, together with the growing
number of American courts experimenting with expanded liability,
suggests that the McLoughlin decision might be a logical extension of
existing law. A blind adoption of McLoughlin, however, is ill-advised.
Within the English judicial system, the reasonable foreseeability
approach may prove workable. The English elimination of jury trials
in personal injury cases assures that all claims of emotional distress
will be adjudicated from the bench." 8 Thus, despite the apparent
open-endedness of the new approach, English judges remain capable
of collectively and uniformly screening claims which conflict with the
process concerns of predictability and consistency. 1 9 Additionally,
the increased costs associated with ambiguous cases are likely to be
minimized in England. 120
Although a reasonable foreseeability approach may prove feasible
in England, legal process considerations suggest that implementation
of that approach in the United States would not be successful. Unlike
its English counterpart, the American judiciary respresents an amal-
gam of diverse backgrounds, training, and values.' 2' Absent explicit
rules of law, American judges are unlikely to produce a consensus suf-
ficient to promote the goals of predictability and consistency. Simi-
larly, the proper functioning of American juries is dependent upon the
presence of explicit rules of law. These rules ensure that jury decisions
fairly reflect the interests of society in addition to those of the individ-
ual plaintiff or defendant.' 22
Due to the above factors, the number of decisions that fail to pro-
mote predictability and consistency would be higher in the United
118. See supra note 91.
119. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying note 95.
122. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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States than in England under the new English approach. Moreover,
systemic differences including varying incentives to litigate and the
disparate treatment of damages between the two systems would result
in the cost of these decisions being significantly higher in the United
States as well. 123 In conclusion, a combination of legal process con-
cerns and systemic differences argue against an American adoption of
the new English approach.
J. Howard Glassover
Kathleen T Tobin
123. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.

